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Using a large sample of financially distressed small firms in Japan, we find that a 
distressed firm goes bankrupt faster if it uses proportionately more trade credits. 
Financially distressed firms experiencing a sharp decrease in trade payables are 
also more likely to go bankrupt. This suggests that coordination failure among a 
large number of dispersed trade creditors contributes to the bankruptcy of 
financially distressed firms. This finding supports the hypothesis that suppliers 
have an incentive to acquire credit information on distressed firms, and are able to 
do so more quickly than banks. Accordingly, they withdraw credits more quickly 
because trade credits, unlike bank loans, are unsecured. 
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1.  Introduction 
This study investigates the relationship between debt structure and the choice of 
legal bankruptcy for financially distressed small businesses. Usually, financially 
distressed firms do not immediately go bankrupt, only a small number of them 
subsequently go bankrupt, and the remaining distressed firms survive. Many 
studies investigate the types of firms going bankrupt using data for listed large 
firms (for example, Franks and Torous (1994), Gilson et al. (1990)). However, 
most bankrupt firms are small firms, so empirical studies using financially 
distressed large businesses are not suitable for examining the relationship between 
debt structure and the choice of bankruptcy.  
Since the problem of information gap between creditors and small firms is 
serious, many previous studies have argued that banks have an advantage in 
monitoring the creditworthiness of small firms. Therefore, they emphasize that 
banks play an important role in debt restructuring choices. For example, using a 
sample of small businesses, Helwege and Packer (2003) find that keiretsu banks 
neither prop up distressed firms that should fail, nor send distressed firms that 
should be rescued to bankruptcy. Similarly, Kang and Stultz (2000) find that the 
poor performance of firms affiliated with main banks is due to the poor health of 
the banks themselves. On the other hand, Franks and Sussman (2005) support the 
lazy bank hypothesis using data on financially distressed small businesses in the 
United Kingdom.  
However, creditors of small businesses consist of not only banks, but also 
trade creditors. We focus on the differences between bank debt and trade credits, 
as well as the differences between bank debt and public debt. First, trade credits 
are unsecured and bank loans are secured. Hence, trade creditors make large 
losses if distressed firms go bankrupt. To avoid large losses, trade creditors then 
have a strong incentive to acquire credit information on the distressed firms (Fama 
(1990), Miwa and Ramseyer (2005)). Second, trade creditors have an information 
advantage over banks since trade creditors have networks for information   3
collection (Petersen and Rajan (1997)). Third, the number of trade creditors is 
large, so coordination among trade creditors in private debt restructurings is 
difficult (von Thaddén et al. (2003)). Therefore, trade creditors immediately 
refuse to extend credit to financially distressed firms.  
For the above reasons, we expect that financially distressed firms that 
proportionately use more trade credit are more likely to choose bankruptcy than 
workouts. It also takes less time for them to go bankrupt because trade creditors 
have a strong incentive to withdraw unsecured credits from financially distressed 
firms as quickly as possible. Many studies on insolvency resolutions focus on the 
roles of banks.
1 In this paper, we explicitly investigate the effect of the fraction of 
trade credit on the bankruptcy of financially distressed firms.  
We use the Credit Risk Database (CRD), a large panel of data on small 
businesses in Japan. The dataset provides the financial statements of small firms 
along with the date when a firm goes bankrupt, as well as other firm 
characteristics. Moreover, the CRD contains small business data after the late 
1990s. Bankruptcy in Japan means that “either there was a court-approved filing 
for one of Japan’s formal bankruptcy procedures, accompanied by a stay on debt 
payment and collection, or there was a public notice of ‘suspension of bank 
transactions,’ triggered by default on a promissory note.” (Helwege and Packer 
(2003), p99).
2 The number of bankruptcy filings has been increasing in Japan 
since the late 1990s (Xu (2004b)), so this database contains a large amount of data 
on bankrupt firms.
3 
Using a sample of 176,104 corporations that suffered debt in excess of assets 
or ordinary losses for more than two consecutive years during the period 1996 to 
2002, we find the following results. First, financially distressed firms are more 
                                                 
1 For example, Hoshi et al. (1990) show that Japanese main banks rescued some listed firms because they 
held credit information on them. 
2 See also Xu (2004a) and Xu (2004b) for more detailed explanations of Japanese bankruptcy procedures. 
3 Recently, Xu (2004a) and Xu (2004b) compared bankruptcy resolution under Corporate Reorganization and 
Civil Rehabilitation using a sample of bankrupt firms publicly traded before bankruptcy. Moreover, Xu 
(2005) analyzes the choices between workout and bankruptcy for large firms.   4
likely to go bankrupt quickly if they use proportionately more trade credits. 
Second, there is a sharp decrease in trade payables after financial distress and 
before bankruptcy. Third, financially distressed firms with a sharp decrease in 
trade payables are likely to go bankrupt. This suggests that coordination failure 
among a large number of dispersed trade creditors contributes to the bankruptcy 
of financially distressed firms. These findings support the hypothesis that 
suppliers have an incentive to acquire credit information on distressed firms and 
are able to do so more quickly than banks. Trade creditors also withdraw credits 
more quickly because trade credits, unlike bank loans, are unsecured. On the other 
hand, the trend in bank credit has no effect on the timing of bankruptcy. This 
finding is also consistent with our basic hypothesis.  
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the theoretical and 
empirical literature. We describe our dataset in Section 3 and explain the 
hypothesis and present the empirical results in Section 4. Section 5 provides some 
final remarks.  
 
2.  Bank Debt vs. Trade Credit 
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are few studies concerning 
bankruptcy in financially distressed small firms. Using data on small- to medium-
sized UK companies, Franks and Sussman (2005) finds that banks rely heavily on 
the value of their collateral in timing the bankruptcy decision. Also, no evidence is 
found of credit runs. Using samples of large firms, a number of studies find that 
capital structure affects the debt restructuring process of distressed firms. For 
example, Franks and Torous (1994), Gilson et al. (1990), James (1995), and 
James (1996) find that distressed firms are more likely to restructure their debt 
privately if they owe more debt to banks and have fewer debt contracts. Recently, 
Xu (2005) found that firms are more likely to restructure troubled debt through 
court-led reorganization than workouts if the proportion of bonds in total debt is 
high. The above findings are consistent with the coordination failure hypothesis   5
for debt restructuring among a large number of dispersed small creditors, as 
analyzed in von Thaddén et al. (2003). Unfortunately, post-workout firms remain 
highly leveraged, with more than 30% of firms subsequently experiencing 
financial distress or bankruptcy (Gilson (1997)). This suggests that financially 
distressed firms that employ proportionately more bank debt tend to survive 
longer than their peers with a relatively high proportion of trade credit.  
Bondholders are typical dispersed small creditors for large firms. When it 
comes to small and midsized firms, trade creditors are usually dispersed. Table 2 
and Table 1 show the numbers of suppliers and banks for small businesses in 
Japan. Table 2 illustrates that most small firms have relationships with less than 
six banks. On the other hand, most small firms purchase from ten suppliers or 
more, and more than half of all small firms purchase from more than thirty 
suppliers (Table 1). These figures imply that trade creditors are dispersed creditors 
and banks are concentrated creditors. Therefore, coordination failure and holdout 
problems arise in the debt restructuring of distressed small and midsized firms that 
use proportionately more trade credit. Consequentially, firms tend to choose 
bankruptcy instead of workouts and go bankrupt faster.  
Many studies, for instance, Diamond (1993), Diamond and Rajan (2000), and 
Diamond and Rajan (2001) assume that financial intermediation produces 
information about the creditworthiness of borrowers. However, as Welch (1997) 
and Miwa and Ramseyer (2005) state, bank loans are usually secured while trade 
credits are unsecured. In addition, Weiss (1990) and Xu (2004a) find that secured 
creditors make fewer losses, even if the borrowers go bankrupt. Therefore, 
secured creditors do not have a strong incentive to acquire credit information. In 
contrast, suppliers have large networks and thus are more able to collect credit 
information. As a consequence, trade creditors have a cost advantage over banks 
in monitoring (Petersen and Rajan (1997)). Because of a superior monitoring 
ability, suppliers can extend credit to small businesses that do not have enough 
assets to serve as collateral (Tsuruta (2007)). On the other hand, once a firm   6
becomes financially distressed, trade creditors withdraw credits as soon as they 
acquire credit information about the distressed firm. Because of cost advantages in 
information acquisition over banks, dispersed trade creditors are then able to cut 
back on trade credit to the distressed firms quicker than bank lenders. In sum, a 
financially distressed firm that proportionately uses more trade credit is more 
likely to go bankrupt in a shorter time.  
 
3.  Sample Selection 
The data in this study are obtained from the Credit Risk Database for Small and 
Medium Enterprises in Japan (CRD). Financial institutions and Credit Guarantee 
Corporations established this database under the guidance of the Small Medium 
Enterprise Agency (SMEA) in Japan. Currently, it is managed by the CRD 
Association.
4 In Japan, Small and Medium Enterprises are defined by the Small 
and Medium Enterprise Basic Law.
5 The dataset provides financial statements and 
other firm characteristics. However, unlike the National Survey of Small Business 
Finances (NSSBF) conducted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System and the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), it does not contain 
information about the length or numbers of relationships with banks.  
In this study, we define a financially distressed firm as a firm that suffered 
debt in excess of assets and ordinary losses for more than two consecutive years 
during the period 1996 to 2002. The sample consists of non-financial and non-
agricultural corporations. As shown in Table 1, of 176,104 financially distressed 
firms, 2,782 firms subsequently went bankrupt and 66,538 firms dropped out of 
the database. In particular, more than half of the firms that suffered financial 
distress before 1999 are censored. The post-distress performance of the distressed 
firms is shown in Table 4. After financial distress, the median return on assets 
                                                 
4 See http://www.crd.ne.jp/ (in Japanese) for more information about the CRD.  
5  See White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan for a definition of Small and Medium 
Enterprises under the Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law.   7
(ROA) of the surviving and noncensored firms improves. Most likely this is 
because financially distressed firms with poor performance afterwards are more 
likely to drop from the CRD. On the other hand, the ratio of total assets to total 
sales, a proxy for firm efficiency, worsens after firms suffer financial distress.  
Table 5 shows the median growth rate of trade payables for firms suffering 
financial distress. Trade payables drop by more than 5% every year. Regardless of 
the improvement in ROA, median trade payable growth tends to decrease. On the 
other hand, the decline in the rate of bank loans after financial distress is small 
(Table 6). Similarly, looking at the median trade payable growth rates and total 
loans growth rates before bankruptcy in Table 7 and Table 8, we find that the 
amount of trade payable is more likely to decrease before bankruptcy. These 
results suggest that suppliers are more likely to cut back on trade credit to 
distressed firms. It is also consistent with the regression results used to estimate 
the hazard function for distressed firms in the next section. 
  
4.  Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Econometric Specification 
To investigate the effects of debt structure on the choice of bankruptcy failing, we 
employ duration analysis. Much of the recent literature on banking relationships 
has applied this method (for example, Ongena and Smith (2001)). Duration 
analysis focuses on the length of time until going bankrupt. We define T as the 
duration of the time spent in bankruptcy. The survival function is S(t)= P (T ≥ t), 
which is the probability of survival in time t. The survival function is also one 
minus the cumulative distribution function of T. The hazard function expresses the 
probability that firms choose bankruptcy filing. It is defined by:  
   8
f(t) is the density function of the distribution of t. λ(t) is hazard rate at time t; 
that is, length of months after financial distress. To estimate hazard functions, we 
assume a proportional hazard specification, such that: 
 
 
X(t) is the set of time-varying explanatory variables at time t, including debt 
structure, firm size, note payables, collateral assets, performance, interest rates, 
and credit guarantee dummies. β  is a vector of unknown parameters for the 
explanatory variables. λ0(t) is the baseline hazard that changes with respect to 
time t. We assume the baseline hazard function to be the Weibull hazard function, 
which is:  
λ0(t)= λp(λt)
p−1
. (4)   
Equation (3) can also be estimated without specifying a functional form for the 
baseline hazard by using the Cox proportional hazards model.
6
                                                 
6 See Lancaster (1990) for detailed information about the Cox proportional hazards model.   9
4.2 Variables 
We use the trade payables to total liability ratio as a proxy of debt structure. As mentioned 
earlier, trade creditors have a strong incentive to acquire information on the firms in 
distress. They also have a cost advantage in acquiring information. To avoid losses in 
bankruptcy, suppliers refuse to extend credit to distressed small firms before banks do so. 
We expect that firms with a higher trade credit ratio are more likely to go bankrupt than to 
restructure debt privately. Consequentially, these firms go bankrupt faster. We also expect 
that the trade credit growth rate has a negative effect on the hazard rate. 
We now turn to the other explanatory variables to be included in Equation (3). First, 
studies on the life duration of new firms find that small firms are less likely to last (Caves 
(1998), Mata and Portugal (1994), and Audretsch and Mahmood (1995)). This is because 
managers of small firms are less talented and less experienced. The size of the firm signals 
the prior success and reputations of entrepreneurs. Smaller firms also have a higher 
proportion of variable costs and thus it is easier for them to exit. When it comes to 
financially distressed firms, however, a high proportion of trade credits may force larger 
firms to go bankrupt faster than smaller firms. The holdout problem among dispersed small 
creditors in private debt restructuring is more likely to occur when larger firms become 
financially distressed. In sum, and somewhat differently from the survival of new firms, the 
expected effect of firm size on the survival of financially distressed firms is ambiguous. We 
use the log of assets as a proxy for firm size.  
The information about unpaid notes is made public by the clearinghouse if buyers 
default on notes payable. Since all banks halt their current account and lending 
transactions for two years with firms whose bills or checks have been dishonored twice 
during a six-month period, this default punishment is equivalent to business failure 
(Matsumura and Ryser (1995)). For these reasons, distressed firms that have more notes 
payables are more likely to go bankrupt, so we add the ratio of notes payable to trade   10
payables
7 
as an explanatory variable. We expect that the notes payable–trade payables 
ratio has a positive effect on the hazard rate. 
In general, banks are able to offer additional credit for firms with more collateral 
assets, even if the firm is distressed. In addition, if a firm has more cash, it can easily pay 
off its liabilities immediately to avoid bankruptcy. The cash to total liability ratio also 
serves as a proxy for liquidity. In short, if a distressed firm possesses more collateral 
assets or cash, it is able to raise additional outside funds, or to pay off its debt when due, 
and thus is more likely to last longer after financial distress. We measure collateral assets 
by the ratio of the sum of land and buildings to total liabilities and the ratio of cash to total 
liabilities. 
To capture the extent of financial distress, we also include the asset turnover ratio 
(sales/assets) and the ratio of ordinary income to assets. A firm deep in financial distress is 
more likely to go bankrupt faster. In Japan, however, ordinary income on the financial 
statements of smaller firms may be underestimated relative to actual ordinary profits to 
secure corporate tax savings. For this reason, we include the product of firm size and the 
ratio of ordinary income to assets as explanatory variables. We predict that the effect of 
firm performance on the hazard rate is stronger for larger firms than smaller firms.  
Some small and middle-sized firms borrow money from owner entrepreneurs. In 
general, entrepreneurs are less likely to withdraw credit and send firms bankrupt. The 
reason is that entrepreneurs not only lose their wealth and reputation, but also have to file 
for personal bankruptcy after the firms go bankrupt. However, data on the amount of loans 
from entrepreneurs are not available. As a proxy for loans from entrepreneurs, we use the 
ratio of interest expense to the sum of short-term debt, long-term debt, and discounted notes 
receivable. Generally, firms borrow money from the owner at lower interest rates. Therefore, 
the more a firm borrows from entrepreneurs, the lower the interest rate. An alternative is 
that lenders charge lower interest rates to viable distressed firms. In any case, a distressed 
                                                 
7 If a firm’s trade payables are zero, we replace this ratio with zero.   11
firm charged a lower interest rate is more likely to avoid bankruptcy.  
In Japan, the publicly-supported credit guarantee program provides important support 
for SME financing. Additionally, the Special Guarantee Program for the Financial 
Stabilization of SMEs was introduced from October 1999 to March 2001. Consequently, 
financially distressed SMEs with the support of credit guarantees are more likely to avoid 
bankruptcy. The credit guarantee dummy is equal to 1 if a SME’s data are provided by a 
credit guarantee corporation, and 0 otherwise. The special credit guarantee dummy is equal 




In Table 9, we summarize the expected signs of the explanatory variables. Industry dummy 
variables, regional dummy variables, and year dummy variables are also included in the 
estimation. Table 10 provides summary statistics of the variables. We use the sample of 
firms that have suffered debt excess and ordinary losses for more than two consecutive 
years in Tables 11-14.
8 
4.3.1 The Effects of Debt Structure  
Table 11 details the results of the logit model and Table 12 the results of the Weibull 
hazard model. The results without the effect of credit guarantees are similar. The 
coefficients of the trade payables–total liability ratio are positive and statistically significant. 
These results imply that the probability of bankruptcy for trade credit dependent firms is 
higher than for bank dependent firms. We also estimate the coefficients of the trade 
payables–total liability ratio for the year when the firm became financially distressed 
(column (2)). The results suggest that the trade payables–total liability ratio has a positive 
effect on the choice of bankruptcy.  
                                                 
8 For robustness, we estimate using a sample of firms that suffered debt excess and ordinary losses for three consecutive 
years. The results using these firms are similar with the results in Tables 11-14.   12
To investigate whether credit run affects the incidence of bankruptcy, we add the rate of 
growth in trade credit to the explanatory variables. The coefficient of trade credit growth 
rate is not statistically significant (results not shown). However, if we divide the trade credit 
growth rate into two, one with a positive sign and the other with a negative sign, the 
coefficient with the negative trade credit growth is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% level (column (3) of Table 12). This suggests that distressed firms are more likely to 
go bankrupt faster when suppliers cut trade credit to distressed firms. However, the 
coefficients with the positive trade credit growth are positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level, which appears inconsistent with our hypothesis. If trade credits for a 
distressed firm are increasing, this may suggest that accommodation bills are drawn by 
other distressed firms. Clearly, more evidence is needed to interpret this puzzle.  
On the other hand, the coefficients for the total loan–total liability ratio, which serves as 
a proxy for the bank loan ratio, is statistically negative at the 1% level (column (4) of Table 
12). In addition, the coefficients of total loan growth are not statistically different from zero 
(column (5)). As discussed earlier, banks, in general, are secured lenders, so they can 
liquidate collateral assets if distressed firms become insolvent. They then have little 
incentive to cut back with credit for financially distressed firms since they do not make 
large losses. In addition, they can restructure debt through workouts more easily since the 
number of creditors is small. Consequently, firms with higher bank loan ratios do not 
choose bankruptcy filings. The results in columns (4) and (5) are consistent with this view. 
4.3.2 The Effects of Other Explanatory Variables  
Interestingly, larger distressed firms are less likely to last. The coefficients for log(assets) 
are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. In contrast, Caves (1998), Mata and 
Portugal (1994), and Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) show larger new firms are more 
likely to last than smaller firms. These results are due to the following reasons. First, the 
number of trade creditors is higher for larger firms than smaller firms. If larger firms   13
experience financial distress, it is difficult for them to coordinate with trade creditors. 
Second, smaller firms are more likely to construct financial statements with ordinary losses 
and excess debt to save on corporate and personal tax payments, even if they are earning 
money. For some smaller firms, suffering debt in excess of assets and ordinary losses might 
then not actually be financial distress. This explanation is supported by the results in 
column (5) of Table 12.  
The effects of the ordinary income–assets ratio are negative. Looking at the results in 
column (6) of Table 12, we find that the ordinary income–assets ratio*log(assets) has a 
significant effect on distressed firms’ survival at the 1% level, while the coefficient on the 
ordinary income–assets ratio is insignificant. This means that the effect of profitability on 
survival depends on the size of the firm. The larger a firm is, the more correctly ordinary 
income equals actual profitability. In other words, smaller firms tend to report lower 
ordinary income and this deviates from actual profitability. If the product of the ordinary 
income–assets ratio and log(assets) is excluded from the explanatory variables, less 
profitable firms are less likely to last.  
The coefficients for interest rate are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
This can be interpreted as meaning that a distressed firm is more likely to last if it is able to 
borrow at lower interest rates. In general, interest rates tend to be lower if the entrepreneur 
lends more to the firm. In such cases, the entrepreneur has no incentive to withdraw credits 
and to send his/her own corporation bankrupt. As a consequence, a distressed firm is more 
likely to survive longer if it borrows more from its owner at lower interest rates. Even if a 
firm is suffering distress, it is able to borrow secured loans from banks if it is rich in 
collateral assets. As shown in Table 12, the coefficients of the proxies for collateral assets 
are negative and statistically significant in all specifications.  
The credit guarantee dummy and the special guarantee dummy both have negative 
effects on the hazard rate if we estimate using the logit model (column (7) of Table 11). 
This supports the viewpoint that distressed SMEs with the support of public credit   14
guarantees are more likely to last longer. Moreover, the Special Guarantee System for the 
Financial Stabilization of Small Businesses strengthens this effect. These results also imply 
that the availability of public credit may distort the optimal timing of bankruptcy filings for 
small businesses. These results are not robust. If we estimate the Weibull survival model, 
the coefficients for credit guarantees are not statistically significant (column (6) and (7) of 
Table  12). 
4.3.3 The Results of Other Models  
For robustness, we estimate the Cox proportional hazards model in Table 13. The results 
for the trade payables and total loans are similar. We also estimate Equation (3) using the 
split-population hazard model. As shown in Table 3, many distressed firms are censored 
and do not choose bankruptcy filing. The duration analysis assumes that the event 
(bankruptcy) occurs for all firms if duration time (t) is sufficiently large. However, not all 
distressed firms become bankrupt, because some firms restructure their debt through 
workouts, or merge with more creditworthy firms. The split-population hazard model 
estimates the hazard rate without such specific assumptions.
9 Nonetheless, the results using 
the split-population hazard model are similar to the results of the Weibull survival model 
and the Cox proportional hazard model. These results imply that the trade payables–total 
liability ratio has a positive effect, and the total loan ratio–total liability ratio has a negative 
effect on hazard rates. In addition, if trade creditors cut back their credit, distressed firms 
are likely to choose bankruptcy filing.  
                                                 
9 See Schmidt and Witte (1989) for a more detailed discussion of the split-population hazard model.   15
5.  Conclusion and Remarks 
In this paper, we analyze the influence of debt structure on the bankruptcy of financially 
distressed small firms in Japan. Distressed small firms using more trade credits are less 
likely to last. There is also a sharp decrease in trade payables before a distressed firm goes 
bankrupt. This suggests that coordination failure among the large number of dispersed trade 
creditors contributes to bankruptcy in distressed firms. In addition, this finding supports the 
hypothesis that suppliers are eager and able to acquire credit information on distressed 
firms faster than banks and thus withdraw credit quickly because trade credits, unlike bank 
loans, are usually unsecured.  
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Source: Shoko Chukin Bank (2004), “Chusho kigyou no keiei jittai tou nikansuru 





Table 2: Number of Banks used by Enterprises in Japan, by Number of 
Employees 
(%)  
No. of employees   1   2   3   4-5  6-10   11- 
-20    18.6 27.8 23.9 20.2 8.1    1.3   
21-100    10.6 17.7 20.5 29.6 17.8   3.8   
101-300   5.7  8.2  10.4  30.7  35.8   9.1  
301-  3.6 4.3 4.5 19.0  34.1    34.6   
 
Source: SMEA (2002), White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan 
 1-10  11-30  31-50  51-100 101-200  201- 
All Firms   12.60  21.50  21.20  21.50  14.00  9.20 
Manufacturers    12.90 22.60 23.60 22.00  13.30  5.50 
Nonmanufacturers    12.40 20.50 19.10 21.00  14.50  12.40  20
 










Table 4: Performance After Financial Distress  
 
Note: We show the median number of each variable, except for the sample number.  
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Note: We define the growth rate as (xt−xt−1)/xt−1. We show only the median number of growth 
rates since the distribution is skewed. The “-100M” group includes firms whose liabilities were 
less than 100 million yen, the “100M–500M” group includes firms whose liabilities were less than 
500 million yen and more than 100 million yen, and the “500M-” group includes firms whose 
liabilities were more than 500 million yen.  
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liabilities were more than 500 million yen.    22
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Table 9: Expected Signs 
Explanatory Variables   Expected Signs  
Log(Assets)   + or - 
Log(1+Age)   + or - 
Interest Rate   +  
Trade Payables/Total Liability  +  
Trade Payables Growth   - 
Total Loans/Total Liability   - 
Notes Payable/Trade Payables  +  
(Land Buildings)/Total 
liability   - 
Cash/Total liability   - 
Ordinary Income/Assets   - 
Sales/Assets   - 
Credit Guarantee   - 
Special Credit Guarantee   - 
 
Table 10: Summary Statistics Legal Bankruptcy  
     
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev. Min 25%  50%  75%  Max
Legal Bankruptcy  270,269   0.007  0.085  0.000  0.000   0.000   0.000  1.000 
Log(Assets)   270,269   10.895  1.460  0.000  9.908   10.761   11.728  20.602 
Log(1+Firm Age)   249,900   3.028  0.661  0.000  2.565   3.091   3.555  7.602 
Interest Rate   229,958   2.735  34.983  0.000  1.539   2.436   3.230  15828.950 
Trade Payables–Total Liability 
ratio   250,085   0.112  0.141  0.000  0.010   0.060   0.161  1.000 
Trade Payables Growth   234,122   0.013  2.155  -13.274  -0.031   0.000   0.014  863.509 
Total Loans–Total Liability 
ratio  
250,085   0.754  0.204  0.000  0.649   0.810   0.912  1.000 
Total Loan Growth   234,122   0.154  30.917   -126.695  -0.096   -0.017   0.078  14261.590 
Notes Payable/Trade Payables   250,089   0.243  0.349  0.000  0.000   0.000   0.547  1.000 
(Land+Buildings)/Total 
Liability  
249,614   0.319  8.726  0.000  0.074   0.196   0.400  4259.500 
Cash/Total Liability   266,260   0.085  0.148  0.000  0.018   0.050   0.114  42.387 
Ordinary Income/Assets   250,083   -0.077  6.920  -3403.500  -0.104   -0.007   0.043  22.895 
Sales/Assets   270,269   2.163  11.146  0.000  0.891   1.611   2.681  4792.718 
Credit Guarantee   270,269   0.490  0.500  0.000  0.000   0.000   1.000  1.000 
Special Credit Guarantee   270,269   0.143  0.350  0.000  0.000   0.000   0.000  1.000 
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Table 11: Logit Model 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Logit Model 
  Sample: Excess of debts and ordinary losses for more than two consecutive terms 
Trade Payables–Total Liability ratio   1.523***     1.328***       1.510***    1.583***  
  (0.183)     (0.203)     (0.184)   (0.188)  
Trade Payables–Total Liability ratio     0.894***            
(at the year of becoming distressed)     (0.183)        
Trade Payables Growth       0.752***          
if Growth Rate is Positive      (0.215)       
Trade Payables Growth       -1.472***          
if Growth Rate is Negative      (0.350)       
Total Loans–Total Liability ratio         -0.671***  -0.684***       
      (0.152)    (0.155)      
Total Loan Growth        -0.073     
if Growth Rate is Positive        (0.152)     
Total Loan Growth        -0.232     
if Growth Rate is Negative        (0.186)     
Log(Assets)   0.373***   0.388***   0.382***   0.395***   0.401***   0.365***   0.376***  
  (0.021)   (0.020)   (0.021)   (0.020)   (0.021)   (0.021)   (0.021)  
Log(1+Firm Age)  0.051   0.031   0.062   0.027   0.021   0.049   0.047  
  (0.046)   (0.046)   (0.047)   (0.046)   (0.047)   (0.046)   (0.047)  
Interest  Rate    0.123***  0.134*** 0.122*** 0.128*** 0.126*** 0.123*** 0.124*** 
  (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.010)   (0.009)   (0.010)   (0.009)   (0.010)  
Notes Payable/Trade Payables   0.661***    0.713***   0.620***   0.757***   0.741***    0.665***    0.638***  
  (0.077)   (0.077)   (0.079)   (0.075)   (0.077)   (0.077)   (0.079)  
(Land+Buildings)/Total Liability   -1.046***    -1.043***   -1.009***   -1.149***   -1.143***    -1.015***    -1.036***  
  (0.118)   (0.119)   (0.118)   (0.119)   (0.121)   (0.117)   (0.119)  
Cash/Total Liability   -8.089***    -7.804***   -7.972***   -7.810***   -7.757***    -8.097***    -8.063***  
  (0.533)   (0.526)   (0.545)   (0.525)   (0.538)   (0.532)   (0.546)  
Ordinary Income/Assets   -0.731***    -0.682***   -0.737***   -0.667***   -0.713***    1.767***    -0.768***  
  (0.107)   (0.107)   (0.109)   (0.107)   (0.111)   (0.728)   (0.108)  
Ordinary Income/Assets*Log(Assets)             -0.251***     
        (0.069)    
Sales/Assets   -0.131***    -0.101***   -0.153***   -0.103***   -0.113***    -0.123***    -0.141***  
  (0.026)   (0.025)   (0.027)   (0.025)   (0.026)   (0.026)   (0.027)  
Credit Guarantee   -0.264***    -0.242***   -0.327***   -0.256***   -0.314***    -0.267***    -0.241***  
  (0.057)   (0.057)   (0.060)   (0.057)   (0.060)   (0.057)   (0.066)  
Credit  Guarantee*SG  Dummy           -0.414***
         (0.150)  
 
Industry Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year Dummies  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Regional Dummies  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Sample   205,488  205,488  199,348  205,488  199,376  205,488  205,488 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. “Interest rate” is the ratio of a firm’s interest expenses to the sum of its 
short-term debt, long-term debt, and discounted notes receivable. When variables include outliers, they are 
truncated at their 0.5th percentiles or 99.5th percentiles of the sample. This result does not change if we truncate 
at their 1st percentiles or 99th percentiles of the sample.  
***Significant at 1% level.  
**Significant at 5% level.  
*Significant at 10% level   25
Table 12: Parametric Hazard Model 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Parametric Hazards Model (Weibull Distribution)  
  Sample: Excess of debts and ordinary losses for more than two consecutive terms 
Trade Payables–Total Liability ratio   1.543***     1.357***       1.538***    1.543***  
  (0.179)     (0.198)     (0.178)   (0.179)  
Trade Payables–Total Liability ratio     0.869***            
(at the year of becoming distressed)     (0.176)        
Trade Payables Growth       0.728***          
if Growth Rate is Positive      (0.207)       
Trade Payables Growth       -1.266***          
if Growth Rate is Negative      (0.345)       
Total Loans–Total Liability ratio         -0.684***  -0.698***       
      (0.149)    (0.153)      
Total Loan Growth        -0.148     
if Growth Rate is Positive        (0.152)     
Total Loan Growth        -0.128     
if Growth Rate is Negative        (0.183)     
Log(Assets)   0.342***   0.359***   0.349***   0.366***   0.368***   0.334***   0.342***  
  (0.020)   (0.020)   (0.021)   (0.020)   (0.020)   (0.020)   (0.020)  
Log(1+Firm  Age)  -0.038  -0.058 -0.015    -0.064    -0.056 -0.042 -0.041 
  (0.046)   (0.046)   (0.047)   (0.046)   (0.047)   (0.046)   (0.046)  
Interest  Rate    0.112***  0.124*** 0.111*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.110*** 0.112*** 
  (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.009)  
Notes Payable/Trade Payables   0.634***    0.690***   0.594***   0.732***   0.710***    0.639***    0.635***  
  (0.076)   (0.076)   (0.078)   (0.074)   (0.076)   (0.076)   (0.076)  
(Land+Buildings)/Total Liability   -0.996***    -0.990***   -0.977***   -1.106***   -1.120***    -0.962***    -0.991***  
  (0.115)   (0.116)   (0.116)   (0.117)   (0.119)   (0.115)   (0.115)  
Cash/Total Liability   -7.582***    -7.278***   -7.472***   -7.297***   -7.247***    -7.597***    -7.581***  
  (0.524)   (0.517)   (0.536)   (0.516)   (0.529)   (0.523)   (0.524)  
Ordinary Income/Assets   -0.776***    -0.726***   -0.780***   -0.711***   -0.764***    1.702***    -0.776***  
  (0.102)   (0.102)   (0.104)   (0.102)   (0.106)   (0.647)   (0.102)  
Ordinary Income/Assets*Log(Assets)             -0.247***     
        (0.061)    
Sales/Assets   -0.127***    -0.095***   -0.146***   -0.100***   -0.107***    -0.119***    -0.128***  
  (0.026)   (0.024)   (0.027)   (0.025)   (0.025)   (0.026)   (0.026)  
Credit Guarantee   -0.087  -0.062  -0.110*    -0.079   -0.095   -0.088  -0.019  
  (0.058)   (0.059)   (0.061)   (0.058)   (0.061)   (0.058)   (0.064)  
Credit  Guarantee*SG  Dummy           -0.356** 
         (0.143)  
 
Industry Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year Dummies  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Regional Dummies  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Sample   205,488  205,488  199,348  205,488  199,376  205,488  205,488 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. “Interest rate” is the ratio of a firm’s interest expenses to the sum of its 
short-term debt, long-term debt, and discounted notes receivable. When variables include outliers, they are 
truncated at their 0.5th percentiles or 99.5th percentiles of the sample. This result does not change if we truncate 
at their 1st percentiles or 99th percentiles of the sample.  
***Significant at 1% level.  
**Significant at 5% level.  
*Significant at 10% level   26
Table 13: Cox Proportional Hazards Model 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Cox Proportional Hazards Model 
  Sample: Excess of debts and ordinary losses for more than two consecutive terms 
Trade Payables–Total Liability ratio   1.483***     1.304***       1.475***    1.482***  
  (0.179)     (0.199)     (0.179)   (0.179)  
Trade Payables–Total Liability ratio     0.930***            
(at the year of becoming distressed)     (0.178)        
Trade Payables Growth       0.675***          
if Growth Rate is Positive      (0.209)       
Trade Payables Growth       -1.339***          
if Growth Rate is Negative      (0.345)       
Total Loans–Total Liability ratio         -0.658***  -0.670***       
      (0.149)    (0.153)      
Total Loan Growth        -0.129     
if Growth Rate is Positive        (0.152)     
Total Loan Growth        -0.167     
if Growth Rate is Negative        (0.184)     
Log(Assets)   0.365***   0.379***   0.374***   0.387***   0.392***   0.357***   0.365***  
  (0.020)   (0.020)   (0.021)   (0.019)   (0.020)   (0.020)   (0.020)  
Log(1+Firm  Age)  0.038  0.022 0.058 0.015 0.018 0.036 0.035 
  (0.046)   (0.046)   (0.047)   (0.046)   (0.047)   (0.046)   (0.046)  
Interest  Rate    0.115***  0.125*** 0.114*** 0.121*** 0.119*** 0.114*** 0.115*** 
  (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.009)  
Notes Payable/Trade Payables   0.661***    0.705***   0.619***   0.754***   0.733***    0.666***    0.662***  
  (0.076)   (0.076)   (0.078)   (0.074)   (0.076)   (0.076)   (0.076)  
(Land+Buildings)/Total Liability   -0.996***    -0.994***   -0.977***   -1.101***   -1.114***    -0.966***    -0.993***  
  (0.115)   (0.116)   (0.116)   (0.117)   (0.119)   (0.115)   (0.115)  
Cash/Total Liability   -7.923***    -7.660***   -7.829***   -7.653***   -7.619***    -7.932***    -7.923***  
  (0.528)   (0.522)   (0.541)   (0.521)   (0.534)   (0.528)   (0.528)  
Ordinary Income/Assets   -0.721***    -0.674***   -0.719***   -0.658***   -0.706***    1.472***    -0.720***  
  (0.105)   (0.105)   (0.107)   (0.106)   (0.109)   (0.640)   (0.105)  
Ordinary Income/Assets*Log(Assets)             -0.219***     
        (0.060)    
Sales/Assets   -0.128***    -0.100***   -0.147***   -0.101***   -0.109***    -0.120***    -0.128***  
  (0.026)   (0.025)   (0.027)   (0.025)   (0.026)   (0.026)   (0.026)  
Credit  Guarantee    -0.325***  -0.305*** -0.363*** -0.320*** -0.352*** -0.325*** -0.249***
  (0.058)   (0.058)   (0.061)   (0.058)   (0.061)   (0.058)   (0.064)  
Credit  Guarantee*SG  Dummy           -0.384***
         (0.144)  
 
Industry Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year Dummies  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Regional Dummies  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Sample   205,488  205,488  199,348  205,488  199,376  205,488  205,488 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. “Interest rate” is the ratio of a firm’s interest expenses to the sum of its 
short-term debt, long-term debt, and discounted notes receivable. When variables include outliers, they are 
truncated at their 0.5th percentiles or 99.5th percentiles of the sample. This result does not change if we truncate 
at their 1st percentiles or 99th percentiles of the sample.  
***Significant at 1% level.  
**Significant at 5% level.  
*Significant at 10% level   27
Table 14: Split-Population Hazard Model 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Split-Population Hazard  Model  
  Sample: Excess of debts and ordinary losses for more than two consecutive terms 
Trade Payables–Total Liability ratio   1.597***    1.413***    1.575***  1.662*** 
  (0.194)    (0.214)    (0.195) (0.198) 
Trade Payables–Total Liability ratio     0.974***           
(at the year of becoming distressed)     (0.196)       
Trade  Payables  Growth       0.726***      
if Growth Rate is Positive     (0.220)      
Trade  Payables  Growth       -1.509***      
if Growth Rate is Negative     (0.345)      
Total Loans–Total Liability ratio     -0.699***  -0.715***    
      (0.158)  (0.161)    
Total Loan Growth        -0.064    
if Growth Rate is Positive       (0.153)    
Total Loan Growth       -0.217    
if Growth Rate is Negative       (0.192)    
Log(Assets)  0.397***  0.420*** 0.402*** 0.428*** 0.429*** 0.389*** 0.395*** 
  (0.024)  (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) 
Log(1+Firm  Age)  0.050  0.028 0.061 0.024 0.018 0.046 0.046 
  (0.047)  (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) 
Interest  Rate  0.133***  0.147*** 0.130*** 0.138*** 0.135*** 0.133*** 0.131*** 
  (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Notes Payable/Trade Payables   0.668***  0.721*** 0.621*** 0.773*** 0.754*** 0.668*** 0.641*** 
  (0.080)  (0.081) (0.081) (0.078) (0.080) (0.080) (0.081) 
(Land+Buildings)/Total Liability  -1.101***   -1.112*** -1.056*** -1.221*** -1.208*** -1.069*** -1.083***
  (0.124)  (0.126) (0.124) (0.127) (0.129) (0.124) (0.125) 
Cash/Total Liability   -8.226***  -7.963***  -8.084*** -7.981*** -7.900*** -8.230*** -8.172***
  (0.542)  (0.538) (0.554) (0.537) (0.549) (0.542) (0.554) 
Ordinary  Income/Assets  -0.736***  -0.700*** -0.744*** -0.679*** -0.718*** 2.439***  -0.768***
  (0.109)  (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.113) (1.038) (0.110) 
Ordinary  Income/Assets*Log(Assets)          -0.321***   
        (0.102)   
Sales/Assets    -0.131***  -0.101*** -0.155*** -0.102*** -0.112*** -0.123*** -0.142***
  (0.027)  (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) 
Credit  Guarantee  -0.287***  -0.256*** -0.341*** -0.272*** -0.332*** -0.281*** -0.261***
  (0.059)  (0.059) (0.061) (0.059) (0.062) (0.059) (0.067) 
Credit  Guarantee*SG  Dummy         -0.389***
         (0.151) 
 
Industry Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year Dummies  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Regional Dummies  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Sample   205,488  205,488  199,348  205,488  199,376  205,488  205,488 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. “Interest rate” is the ratio of a firm’s interest expenses to the sum of its 
short-term debt, long-term debt, and discounted notes receivable. When variables include outliers, they are 
truncated at their 0.5th percentiles or 99.5th percentiles of the sample. This result does not change if we truncate 
at their 1st percentiles or 99th percentiles of the sample.  
***Significant at 1% level.  
**Significant at 5% level.  
*Significant at 10% level 
 